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This essay suggests that it does not follow that competition between jurisdictions is good
merely because competition between economic operators in pursuit of economic goals is a good
thing. The result, as the discussion on television indicated, may simply be a jurisdictional mess,
as Dr. Markus Wagemann put it. You end up with all sorts of people seeking to pursue their own
values: cultural values, regional values, and linguistic values; and the economic operator simply
does not know where he or she stands in this jurisdictional competition. This point can perhaps
be completed by simply mentioning a remark made to me by Klaus Dieter Ehlermann, the former
Director General of Competition and of the legal service of the Commission: ‘It is the lawyers who
make the good distinctions; politicians only make the distinctions that are convenient for them.‘
It is important to begin by making sure what we are talking about. My second point arises out of
Professor Dr. Friedl Weiss’s paper. From the vantage point of a judge, we are increasingly faced,
not with a hierarchy of norms, but a competition between norms of apparently equal value. This
essay then reflects that this is not the first time we have experienced a world in which there was the
fullest competition between lower level jurisdictions. Third, this essay considers the importance
of taking state aid into account. This essay concludes that greater jurisdictional autonomy leads to
greater barriers to trade.
PERSPECTIVES ON COMPETITION LAW:
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
Judge David A. 0. Edward*
I can only offer you the reflections of a non-specialist Euro-
pean Union (or "EU") judge. I begin with two general points.
The first comes from what I was taught when I studied philoso-
phy: it is important to avoid categorical mistakes. We are talking
here in the context of competition. Professor Dr. Wolfgang Ker-
ber has spoken about competition between individuals, between
firms, and now between jurisdictions as if we were talking about
the same thing. He has equiparated taxes with prices. But is the
price for the economic operator of being regulated in a particu-
lar way simply being subjected to a particular tax or to a more or
less rigid regulatory regime?
Now, I am not taking issue with Dr. Kerber on the desirabil-
ity of allowing lower level jurisdictions the greatest measure of
autonomy. But I do not think it follows that competition be-
tween jurisdictions is good merely because competition between
economic operators in pursuit of economic goals is a good
thing. The result, as the discussion on television indicated, may
simply be a jurisdictional mess, as Dr. Markus Wagemann put it.
You end up with all sorts of people seeking to pursue their own
values: cultural values, regional values, and linguistic values; and
the economic operator simply does not know where he or she
stands in this jurisdictional competition.1 That is my first point
and perhaps I can complete it by simply mentioning a remark
made to me by Klaus Dieter Ehlermann, the former Director
General of Competition and of the legal service of the Commis-
sion: "It is the lawyers who make the good distinctions; politi-
cians only make the distinctions that are convenient for them."
So I think it is important to begin by making sure what we are
talking about.
My second point arises out of Professor Dr. Friedl Weiss's
paper. From the vantage point of a judge, we are increasingly
* Judge, Court of Justice of the European Communities since 1992.
1. I will come back to that, because I think that this discussion must take into
account that there are rather specific features of Europe, and specifically, the problems
of many languages, many legal systems, many traditions and a vast amount of history.
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faced, not with a hierarchy of norms, but a competition between
norms of apparently equal value. There is the norm of competi-
tion, which on World Trade Organization' ("WTO") terms, is
raised to a global level. But that is set against the norm of envi-
ronment, the norm of third world development, the norm of
social improvement, the norm of cultural identity, the norm of
protection of minorities, and, even within the EU, the conflict
between EU-norms and constitutional norms, particularly the
constitutions of federal Member States.
The difficulty is, that instead of a situation where the judge
is in a position simply to operate an on/off 10 switch, and say,
"This is the norm that prevails and you win and you lose," the
judge is to an increasing extent operating a synthesizer with mul-
tiple bands, which, of course, must be made compatible. In one
case it will be the human rights norm that prevails, in another
case it may be the environmental norm, and in yet a third case it
may be the competition norm.
From the regulator's point of view, of course, this problem
is, or at least may be, removed, because the regulator may be
invited simply to apply one norm, the norm of competition.
And similarly in the WTO, the WTO panel may simply be asked
to access the particular problem by reference to the WTO rules,
but not to continue and say, "Well, if we apply these rules, what
is the consequence for the development of underdeveloped
countries, what is the consequence for the rain forest, what are
all the consequences?" It seems to me, therefore, that one must
bear in mind that what we may be talking about is both competi-
tion between legal norms and competition between values.
More importantly, it is for the politicians to resolve the competi-
tion between values, and for the lawyers to resolve the competi-
tion between norms once the values have been translated into
norms. It is for the politician to say which value is to prevail, and
it is for the judge to say which norm is to prevail.
My view is that this is a problem of which we are only just
beginning to become aware, far less to analyze, because tradi-
tional legal teaching is still in terms of the hierarchy of norms.
Even in EU law, the traditional teaching is in terms of supremacy
and so on, so that you have a clearly defined hierarchy and you
2. Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization [World Trade Or-
ganization], Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
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will be able to solve your problem by appeal to that hierarchy. I
am not sure that that is still an adequate way of analysis.
Coming back then to Professor Kerber's competition be-
tween jurisdictions, perhaps the more appropriate question is,
what do we want jurisdictions to compete about? When we are
talking about autonomy at a lower jurisdictional level, is compe-
tition between values, legal norms, or implementation of specific
policies in specific ways more favorable? Here I think we have to
bear in mind another fact, which was mentioned yesterday again,
which is the reduction of the possibilities of government inter-
vention. There are in fact fewer and fewer opportunities for ju-
risdictions, at whatever level, to operate in an entirely autono-
mous way. That was illustrated by Karl Messen's remark that me-
dia law is the only sexy subject left to the Lnder. You can have
as much autonomy as you like, but what is left for you to legislate
about? This is a debate which is now going on in my country, in
Scotland, because there is great excitement concerning the new
Scottish Parliament. But what is the Scottish Parliament in real-
ity going to be able to legislate about? This is a point that has
not been fully discussed.
My next reflection is this, and it arises out of something of
Professor Weiss's paper. Have we not been here before? Have
we not experienced a world in which there is the fullest competi-
tion between lower level jurisdictions? Did we not precisely have
that under the name of self-determination between 1918 and
1939? Is that not precisely the only socially and politically un-
happy experience, but also the economically unhappy experi-
ence of the years when the nation-state was perceived as having a
full right to total autonomy in deciding policies? What is the
difference then between doing what Professor Kerber is advocat-
ing and the full autonomy of the nation state?
Even then, if you take the situation up to 1985-86 and the
Single European Act,3 we had a situation that seems in theory to
correspond to Professor Kerber's model. This act laid down
rules of free mobility, and free circulation of goods, persons,
services, and capital. But what did we have? We had what Mr.
Decker of Philips called "the cost of non-Europe." You had the
3. Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 (amending
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11).
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theory but not the practice. So it was necessary for Lord
Cockfield to propose 530 legislative measures in order to achieve
the abolition or the avoidance of the cost of non-Europe. That
was what was perceived as necessary.
The difficulty is that in the meanwhile the Member States
rediscovered (because it was always there) the notion of sub-
sidiarity and shied away from the necessary legislation. The con-
sequence is that the Single European Act's banking and insuring
directives put in place a theoretically perfect internal market,
but leave half the really crucial questions to be decided later. Is
a company account to be drawn up on the true and fair view
basis or on the rather more straight profit and loss basis that is
characteristic of some countries? That question simply is
avoided. You have a banking directive, which dictates a harmo-
nized system, but then says, Member States can maintain rules
conceived for the general good.
The above example simply puts off the resolution of the
problem rather than solve it. And I must admit that you cannot
sit in the European Court of Justice ("European Court") for
more than ten minutes without realizing that the Internal Mar-
ket is not complete. The reason for this incompleteness, it
seems to me, is because Europe's problems are specific. Eu-
rope's problems are, as I have said, characterized by many lan-
guages, many traditions, many legal systems, and many different
ways of approaching things as mundane as company accounting.
Simply, you start from a different place.
Another reason why Europe's problems are specific is that
because the process of self-determination, as it has manifested in
Western Europe and is still being worked out in Eastern Europe,
tends to produce Member States, which correspond to ethnic
blocks or people who perceive themselves as belonging to an
ethnic block, these states therefore have particular reasons for
adopting a particular solution or a particular protection. This is
valuable in their terms but constitutes a technical barrier to
trade for everybody else. Forget the comparison between Eu-
rope and the United States. You do not have the specificity of
the nation states of Europe in the United States. It is a categori-
cal mistake to make a direct comparison.
I do not intend to criticize anything, I am just looking at
facts. And one of the facts is that personal mobility is necessarily
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limited. People find it more difficult to go and live in a country
where they cannot speak the language, and where their view of
the way life should be conducted does not correspond to the
view of the people of that country. It is perfectly legitimate that
people should have their own view as to whether you should
mow your lawn on Sunday afternoon, but for a person who
comes from another country, it may be a great culture shock not
to be allowed to mow lawns on a Sunday afternoon.
What I am saying was focused upon by Douglas Hurd, the
British Foreign Secretary, who said, "We do not want Brussels
poking into the nooks and crannies of national life." True, but
your poking into crannies is my technical barrier to trade. Your
desire to have your language used on labels, puts a restraint on
me as a producer, in deciding how I label my products generally
for the market. So you must have some central authority, which
dictates that it is enough if you use, for example, the official lan-
guage of the country where you are going to trade. You do not
have to use Catalan as well as Castilian, or Basene as well as Cas-
tilian. But regional autonomy, lower level autonomy, might im-
pose such a requirement.
Another issue, I think that we must take into account is state
aids. The whole economy of Europe was one in which the no-
tion of state aids was ingrained in a way not found, for example,
in the United States. The idea that a nation not only can but
should support and protect its own industry is one that has al-
ways existed and lurks still today. When Mr. Helmut Kohl and
Mr. Jacques Chirac sent a letter before the last summit, saying
that there should be greater subsidiarity, one has a strong suspi-
cion that Mr. Chirac wanted to continue to subsidize Air France
and that Mr. Kohl wants to subsidize Volkswagen. That is what it
is really about. John Temple-Lang and his regulators are getting
in the way of this "cultural autonomy."
And so, for me, the short point is that the greater the juris-
dictional autonomy, the greater the technical barriers to trade.
Technical barriers to trade are not necessarily the same as forced
protectionism. They exist naturally. It is problematic to trade
between countries that have different legal systems, simply be-
cause the legal systems are different. You do not have to have an
intention to create a barrier. When a trademark in one country
is not recognized as a trademark in another country, that is a
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technical barrier to trade without any protectionist intention on
the part of either country involved.
My personal view is that the original Treaty establishing the
European Community4 (the "EC Treaty") went a long way to-
wards the correct solution of the problem, namely laying down
the basic "foundations". It is rather significant that the Treaty
on European Union5 took that word out. In the EC Treaty the
four freedoms, of free movement-goods, persons, services and
capital-were said to be the "Foundations of the European Com-
munity." That, in a sense, really is what Professor Kerber is say-
ing: that we must have mobility as a condition of autonomy.
My difficulty is that I do not believe the mobility has yet
been achieved. A great myth is being circulated that we have
completed the Internal Market and so now we can dismantle it.
This is a myth that we should contest rather than accept. You
must have the rules of free movement and they must be legally
binding, and legally enforceable. Accordingly, you must have
some means of dispute settlement, which defines at what point a
particular jurisdictional option becomes a technical barrier to
trade.6 You must have some authority that dictates what should
be treated as a technical barrier to trade, and what falls outside.
In the European system, this authority is the European Court.
The EC Treaty actually put a system in place capable of
achieving the maximum degree of jurisdictional autonomy. The
difficulty, and I confess this quite openly, is that we are now be-
ing faced not simply with the rules of the EC Treaty, but also
with a wish list of other things which everybody has to take into
account. I have enumerated them before-environment, third
world, everything. You take all of these issues into account and
the difficulty, I think, is that we do not know which of them in
any given case is to prevail.
So my plea to you really is to lift your eyes from pure compe-
4. Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1 (1992),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R 573, incorporating changes made by Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7,
1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty on
European Union ("TEU") amended the Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by
SEA.
5. TEU, supra note 4.
6. For example, the European Court has pondered whether a rule preventing
shops from opening on Sunday is a technical barrier to trade, a political option, or a
cultural option of a member state.
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tition. Within a regulatory framework, that may be sufficient be-
cause you simply ask the regulator to apply that criterion. But at
the judicial or political level you must go further and define
which are the values you want to pursue, what are the norms that
flow from those values, and which norms are to take precedence.
